Explaining the vicious circle of political repression and islamic radicalism in Central Asia

Abstract

Since gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have faced various political challenges, including the existence of political Islam and Islamic extremism. This issue has had a slight impact on the entire region, albeit to different extents. Various perspectives have been proposed to elucidate why political Islam in this region has predominantly manifested as religious fundamentalism. Alternatively, the frustration-aggression hypothesis and Merton’s social strain theory provide illustrations of these approaches. Consistent with this concept, severe suppression and authoritarianism do not eliminate political dissent; instead, they can stimulate further disagreement and conflict. The study argues that the severe political suppression of both religious and secular opposition groups has caused them to withdraw from public view and has led to a rise in violence in the Central Asian Republics. This study employs a qualitative research method and a descriptive-analytical methodology to examine the correlation between political repression and the rise of Islamism in five countries in Central Asia. According to the results of the present study, it seems that governments in Central Asia prefer to understand political Islam in a manner that is too simplistic and characterised by a strict division into two opposing categories. Furthermore, they display a lack of acceptance of even moderate and liberal manifestations of Islamism. Inadvertently, this approach has facilitated the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in CARs. The government in this region should develop new ways to allow conversations for future generations of moderate and secular Muslims to combat Islamic extremism.

Keywords:

• Central Asia
• political repression
• Islamic fundamentalism
• Political Islam

REVIEWING EDITOR:

• Robert Read, Economics, University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK

SUBJECTS:

• Central Asian Politics
• Political Theory
• Sociology & Social Policy

Introduction

Islam entered Central Asia as the main religion at the beginning of the eighth century, after the conquests of Muslim Arabs. From this period onwards, Central Asia became one of the main centres of Islamic culture and civilization, and as a result, Islam became a fundamental component of cultural and ethnic identity for most of the people of Central Asia. Many famous Islamic philosophers and scientists, such as Ibn Sina, al-Farabi, and al-Biruni, originated from Central Asia. Many Islamic empires, such as the Seljuks, Samanids, Timurids, and Mughals of India, had their roots in Central Asia. In the last years of the eighteenth century, the Russian Tsars established the Spiritual Administration of Muslims (Muftiat) in Orenburg to manage the activities of Muslims. During this period, Muslims were able to observe their Islamic rites and religious traditions and continue Islamic rituals in various ways (Koulae, 2005). During the 70 years of Soviet rule, an anti-religious policy was openly pursued in Central Asia, which began with anti-Islamism in the North Caucasus. The intensity of the aforementioned policies has varied at different times. The Soviet Union’s constitution forbade religious education in schools, and the government attempted to significantly diminish the influence of Islam in people’s spiritual lives by implementing cultural and educational reforms. On the other hand, many Muslims, including Sufis, tried to preserve Islam as a manifestation of the identity of the people of the region and thereby prevent the complete destruction of the cultural foundation of Islam in this region.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism in 1991 caused an ideological vacuum that was, at times, filled by political Islam in the region. The emergence of continuous political crises in the region, especially in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and the proximity of the region to Afghanistan as a centre of radical Islamism, aggravated this issue. This led to the rise of Islamic extremism in the 1990s in many Central Asian countries (Bakhodyr, 2011). After suppressing these forces in Central Asia in the 1990s and 2000s, hundreds of Muslims migrated and joined ISIS and the Taliban. Based on the available information, it can be said that the citizens of Russia and Central Asia constitute the third largest group of ISIS fighters. It is worth mentioning that ISIS ideology has been described as a hybrid of Salafism, Messianism, and Qutbism. Salafism opposes any innovation in Islam, and Qutbism stimulates violence against both Muslims and non-Muslims. These gangs actively contributed to worsening religious divisions by carrying out targeted assassinations and destroying sites of worship belonging to different religious sects, all under the protection of recognised sovereign leaders (Al-Kassimi, 2021). ISIS maintains the restoration of the caliphate and requires all Muslims to pledge allegiance to Islam as developed by Prophet Muhammad and the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs (Manne, 2017). However, the foreign fighters who joined this group had diverse religious and non-religious motives, including some with criminal backgrounds (Speckhard & Ellenberg, 2020). Therefore, those who joined ISIS from Central Asia did not necessarily have similar goals and motives or to be considered as pious Muslim. Recently, ISIS Khorasan is the continuation of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and a large number of its members are from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

According to the findings of the International Centre for Extremism Studies, 360 Turkmen citizens fought in favour of the ISIS front. The Ministry of Interior of Kyrgyzstan confirmed that more than 500 citizens of its citizens joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The information from Kazakhstan’s security services also shows that about 400 Kazakh citizens joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The Muslim Council of Uzbekistan believes that about 200 Uzbek citizens joined ISIS. The number of Uzbek fighters was calculated at 1500. Some Uzbek groups have united with Jabhat al-Nusra, and some other Uzbek groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, have declared their loyalty to ISIS. Only 200 members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have joined other Islamist groups in Afghanistan. Imam Ali Rahman, the president of Tajikistan, has announced that more than a thousand Tajik citizens have joined the ranks of ISIS in Syria (Diyanat et al., 2018). Other sources indicate a double figure as many as 5650 fighters and their family from Central Asia went to Syria and Iraq to join various jihadist groups fighting there. Out of them, 2000 are reported to be nationals of Tajikistan, 2000 of Uzbekistan, 850 of Kyrgyzstan, and 800 of Kazakhstan (Soliev, 2021). The PEW survey results show that there is a vast orientation for some Islamist positions in Central Asia, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Kubicek, 2019). This statistic shows the potential of religious extremism in Central Asia. Instead of creating an atmosphere of fair political participation and political cooperation, the governments of the region have, in most cases, tried to suppress Islamist groups, both moderate and extreme, and this has pushed political Islamism in the region further underground. Consequently, the dominant tendency of some Islamist groups in the region has become radical. This article analyses the relationship between the severe political repression of Central Asian governments and the radicalization of Islamism in these countries.

Literature review

Islam in Central Asia is not a topic that has just begun attracting the attention of scholars, academics, and policymakers. No book on Central Asia fails to acknowledge Islam and Muslims in the region. A famous scholar, S. Frederic Starr, has discussed in detail in his well-known work ‘Lost Enlightenment’ (2013) how the Central Asian Republics (CARs), particularly Uzbekistan, contributed to shaping modern Islam. However, like the rise and fall of CARs, the story of Islam in the region has been very much the same. Related to the current theme of this research article, a substantial body of literature has been produced. Some of the significant works have been cited in this article. James Pickett (2020) examines the social and intellectual influence of religious leaders who, from the middle of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth, united Central Asia, Iran, and India. It shows that Islamic intellectuals were simultaneously mystics and administrators, judges and occultists, doctors and poets. Along the same lines, Bayram Balci (2018) examines Islamic influences, their impacts on local societies, and how they have affected pre-existing religious practices and beliefs. According to Cribb and Herrmann (2007), this enormous, landlocked area has a harsh continental climate and large metropolises, which have made it a prominent centre of civilization. Its multi-religious populace practiced Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Buddhism and engaged in considerable trade with China, India, the Middle East, and Europe. In regard to extremism and violence, Naumkin (2003) examines the roots and causes of Islamic radicalism, clarifies the terms ‘Salafism’ and ‘Wahhabism’, and examines violence as a culture. He goes on to argue that Uzbek President Karimov’s repression of ordinary Muslims is counterproductive in the struggle against Islamists. Eren Tasar (2017) and Thibault (2018) argue that the Communist Party’s efforts to seize control over mosques throughout Central Asia led to changes in Islamic practices and dogma and international propaganda targeting the Islamic World. However, Emmanuel Karagiannis (2016) and Adeeb Khalid (2021) argue that a new generation of Islamist leaders in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan advocate for a more public role for Islam without seeking regime change. They can be called Islamo-democrats because they participate in elections and recognize the constitutional process. Lucia Direnberger (2020) focuses on the differences between secular nationhood in Tajikistan and an increasingly popular and influential Muslim identity. Thibault focuses on the differences between secular nationhood in Tajikistan and the increasingly prominent and effective Muslim identity. Ro’I (1995) writes how Islam plays a crucial role in how people identify themselves, especially in Uzbekistan, but not necessarily in the all-encompassing or strictly religious way often ascribed to it. Luke Falkenburg (2013) argues that militant Islam remains a viable threat to regional security, regardless of its current numbers. Afghanistan will be an essential factor in the future of Central Asian militancy, and the specific form of this re-emergence is yet to become apparent. Svetlana Peshkova (2015) argues that it is not ‘militant Islam’ but a growing Islamic civil society that ‘provides a constant challenge to Karimov’s autocracy and legitimacy’, which ensures a tense relationship between the state and Islam’. Kathrin Lenz-Raymann (2014) argues that diverse Islamic groups have triggered a ‘revival of Islam’ in Central Asia in the last decades. As a result, the majority of scholars assumed Islamism was equivalent to radicalism, and consequently, there has been a general securitization of Islam by the CAR governments; they combat extremist and outlaw popular rather peaceful groups such as the Hizmet or Gulen movement and Tablighi Jamaat. Lenz-Raymann concludes that ensuring religious rights is essential for national security. Most of the above research elaborates on how Muslim identities began to be shaped during and after the Soviet Union, as well as in preceding periods. These studies did not, however, individually address each CAR at length, analysing how the political regimes have suppressed Muslims and their freedom to practice Islam and participate politically. Therefore, they did not make the connection with the suppression of religious-political rights and the emergence and intensification of religious radicalism.

Despite repressive religious policies, the popularity of Islamic leaders is experiencing a notable increase. This trend can be attributed to the growing influence of the internet and social media. As a result, imams and preachers are reclaiming the influence they had lost, initially due to former President Islam Karimov’s stringent stance against Islam. These religious leaders have successfully established a significant presence on various online platforms and social media networks. Through these channels, they have managed to accumulate a substantial number of followers, reaching into the millions. The combination of increased access to information through the internet and the relaxation of restrictions on speech has enabled Islamic leaders in Uzbekistan to regain their prominence and actively engage with a wider audience, both religiously and politically (Saida, 2023). This shows that repression just changes the venue from the on-the-ground reality to a virtual domain. This study attempts to fill that gap and argues that most Muslims avoid radicalism in contemporary Central Asia.

Theoretical considerations: the relationship between political repression and radicalization of political groups with religious orientation

There are various theories which explain religious extremism and religious-based terrorism. But there is no doubt that severe political repression, which obstructs legitimate political demands and denies people identity, is one of the main causes of religious extremism. Perhaps the oldest theory about radicalism and violence is the frustration-aggression hypothesis. It states that while frustration prompts a behaviour that may or may not be aggressive, any aggressive behaviour is the result of frustration, making frustration not sufficient but a necessary condition for aggression. Behavioural psychologists posit that this aggressive behaviour is instinctive, and when there is an obstacle obstructing the legitimate needs or desires of individuals or society, it can trigger anger and even violence (Friedman & Schustack, 2014). Cognitive psychologists, despite some differences in their perspectives, generally concur with behaviourists regarding the hypothesis that any frustrating event provoking negative emotions can potentially lead to aggression and violence. These events can range from physical pain and discomfort to political pressure. Cognitivists use the term ‘blocked goal’ to describe the frustrating event that provokes anger and violence. The bigger, more unjustified, chronic, and dense the scope and intensity of the failure and blocking of goals, the more explosive the risk of provoking anger and violence becomes (Breuer & Elson, 2017). One concrete example of a blocked goal is the imposition of severe political repression that obstructs political participation and the expression of political identity. When social groups lack the opportunity to participate in politics and face identity denial, they encounter a blocked goal and may turn to political violence. This is what Johan Galtung calls ‘structural violence’ (Galtung, 1969, p. 16). Galtung defines structural violence as a form of violence that social structures or institutions impose on individuals. This type of violence can ultimately be the source of another type of violence called religious extremism (Galtung, 1969, pp. 191–197). Galtung asserts that violence arises when the somatic or mental potential of human beings remains unrealized (Galtung, 1969, p. 168). Galtung maintains that violence encompasses both physical and psychological aspects, with the latter referring to a form of violence inflicted upon the human mind or psyche, however one may wish to articulate it (Galtung, 1975).

Another relevant theory is the social strain theory, which was developed by sociologist and criminologist Robert K. Merton. This theory posits that when a political system exerts pressure on groups and individuals, preventing them from attaining socially accepted goals like political participation and acquiring political power, this pressure can potentially drive people towards violence. In essence, social structures can create circumstances that push citizens to engage in criminal behavior. Strain can take on a structural form, referring to the societal-level processes that trickle down and impact how individuals perceive their material and social needs (Agnew, 2001).

Expanding upon Merton’s theory and its application regarding terrorist activities and religious extremism, Agnew believes that one of the sources of strain is the government’s severe repression of citizens’ legitimate demands. In order for individuals who perceive themselves as victims to resort to violence, they must harbor strong negative emotions towards the government or its social collaborators. They feel desperate to solve the problem normally. Social control will be reduced, and eventually, a collective identity of victimhood will be created. Negative emotions, which typically encompass sentiments like anger, humiliation, and despair, often serve as a prelude to resorting to violent actions. These emotions can diminish the capacity to resolve problems through legal means, given their mentally corrosive nature, and may compel individuals under pressure to turn to terrorist acts. When ordinary people face pressure, their options for resolving the issues at hand significantly decrease. If these people resorted to methods such as negotiation, lobbying, mediation, and so on in order to solve their problems in a normal situation, they would pay attention to less compromising options in conditions of strain and oppression. This means that the strains cause withdrawal from political processes, and the emergence of violent types of protest looks appealing. Also, when the power gap between the ruling people and the strained groups expands, the strained people are more likely to apply non-peaceful methods of problem-solving. The aforementioned strains also reduce the control factors of a community that prevent resorting to terrorism. These strains weaken the emotional relationships between the people under pressure and the source of the pressure and make the people under pressure think that they have nothing to lose if they resort to terrorist action. These strains downplay the ugliness and illegality of terrorist acts and instead justify sympathy and tolerance for terrorists, which results in supporting terrorism and terrorist acts. As a result, oppressed groups, facing repression and identity denial from stronger entities such as the government, tend to form a distinct collective identity. This collective identity leads to the phenomenon of groupthink, where the fate of a group affects the fate of the members of the group and vice versa. As a result, the group’s leader and members solidify their cohesion (Agnew, 2010).

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the persistence of authoritarian presidential regimes in Central Asian countries (with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, which transitioned to a parliamentary system in 2010), the emergence of religious extremism in the five newly independent republics became a significant security issue. The pressures stemming from the authoritarian political structure have played a significant role in the emergence and proliferation of religious extremism within this region. Despite the incorporation of democratic principles in the constitutions of these countries, the necessary conditions and platforms for the formation and operation of independent political parties with an Islamic orientation have not been established. Since 1991, the leaders of the region have emphasized the priority of preserving the ruling regime, which has hindered the growth and activity of political parties and civil society within the legal framework. The political structures in these countries have been built on loyalty to the ruling party and individuals, thereby providing little room for peaceful political expression by Islamist political groups, both extremist and moderate. This article employs a qualitative and descriptive analytics methodology to delve into the aforementioned theoretical framework. It extensively examines the lack of favorable platforms for political engagement within each of the five republics, providing detailed analysis and insights.

A short modern history of Islamic movements

The Central Asian region is rich in history and has a blend of identities, ethnicities, and cultures. However, Islamic extremism revolves either around the need to combat extremism as terrorism or the necessity for the state to stop oppressing ordinary believers in fear of a religious takeover of society. Since the Central Asian states gained their independence from the USSR in 1991, the region has witnessed the growth of Islam and Islamist organisations, who, despite having various ideologies, objectives, and strategies, share the common purpose of reviving Muslims’ beliefs within the CARs. It is believed that the Ferghana valley is the main centre of militant Islam in the region. Many factors have encouraged the relative popularity of Islamists in the valley. In addition to radical belief, corruption, nepotism, a decreasing standard of living, and endemic unemployment pushed many people into the arms of radical movements.

Tasar (2017) says ‘Islam in the region consists of an interaction between a “textual” Islam imported from the Middle East and a much older set of “shamanistic” beliefs and practices indigenous to Central Asia “lightly sitting on the latter”’. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were viewed as centres of study and piety (much like mediaeval Bukhara and Samarkand). Based on historical practices and readings of religious texts, Muslims in the CARs can be divided into three groups: traditionalists or conservatives, modernists, and reformists (Khan, 2020). The majority of traditionalist or conservative clergy in the area recognised Russian rule as legitimate. The ‘modernists’, such as the reformers of the Jadid (new method), did likewise. For them, the goal was to push the boundaries of religious belief and theocratic philosophy in order to empower Muslims to successfully compete with other members of the empire. In addition to the complaints of modernists, ‘fundamentalists’, who objected to the religious leadership for its lack of purity and departure from the ‘true path’ of Islam, also attacked Central Asia’s religious establishment. Some of these opponents were Salafi Muslims who only embraced Islamic doctrines that were relevant to early Muslim civilization and the first four Caliphs, rejecting the four schools of Sunni Islamic law. The 1920s–1960s saw the beginning of ‘Reformist’ Islam in Uzbekistan becoming radicalised. Throughout the Soviet era, illegal schools, also known as ‘hujra’, persisted despite the best efforts of Stalin’s terror apparatus and Soviet anti-religious propagandists. You could find these schools in Tashkent and the Ferghana Valley much more frequently.

Developed from the ideas of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1791), Ibn Taymiyyah’s takfiri doctrine, and the strict Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, the extreme form of Islam known as Wahhabism has gained significant traction in the CARs primarily due to funding from Saudi Arabia and the missionary efforts of Saudi-based charities like the Muslim World League (Khan, 2012). The House of Saud has made considerable use of Saudi petrodollars to ‘wahhabize Islam worldwide’ (Kepel, 2002, p. 52). The Saudis joined the CARs in an effort to win allies and stop Iranian-backed Shia expansionism in the Middle East as a result of their bitter rivalry with Shia Iran. Many young people from Central Asia took advantage of the opportunity to pursue higher education in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia, where they encountered Wahhabism and returned with new ideas.

As discussed above, it is crucial to consider the larger context of the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in sovereign Central Asia. Islamist fundamentalism did not emerge out of thin air. Its roots were in the treatment of Muslims. Stalin, who oversaw the Soviet Union from the mid-twentieth century until 1953, made an effort to destroy Islam and cut off Central Asia from the rest of the Muslim world. Arabic-language books were destroyed. Offices were not open to Muslims. There were roughly 26,000 mosques in 1912. Less than 1000 remained by 1941 (Kuszewska & Khan, 2020; Peyrouse, 2015, p. 37). Khrushchev carried on Stalin’s anti-Islamic policies by closing all surviving mosques and schools, prohibiting Islamic weddings and funerals, burning veils in public, and dissolving Islamic Sharia courts. Despite this state-sanctioned hostility, ‘right across the Steppe, Islam thrived in a semi-underground world’ (Rashid, 1994, p. 41). Some Central Asians ‘fell prey to extremist groups, which were ready to fill that gap in their quest for information and religious knowledge’ (Kamalov, 2017). Political activism was carried out by organisations like Adolat (Justice), which in 1991 displeased the Uzbek government by calling for President Karimov to be overthrown and the foundation of an Islamic state (Rotar, 2003). Following a government crackdown a few months later that resulted in thousands of arrests, Islamic extremists in Uzbekistan began to go to Tajikistan (The World Almanack of Islamism, 2019). Karimov officially declared Adolat to be a terrorist organisation in 1992 (Sanderson et al., 2010, p. 6).

In modern Central Asia, several Islamic movements have emerged as a result of the Soviet atrocities. Major groups have been elaborated on in this study. Among the prominent ones is the Jadid movement, a manifestation of anti-Soviet agitation and a call for social, cultural, and religious rebirth (Khan & Koch, 2021). The Sufi brotherhoods, or tariqah, mostly maintained Muslim life and religious ritual independent from the Communist system, despite attempts at ‘Russification’ by the Soviet government. A significant Islamic renaissance occurred under Gorbachev and his reform initiatives, Glasnost and Perestroika. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was formally established in 1998 by Uzbek extremists Yuldashev and Namangani (the founders of Adolat), with the aim of overthrowing the Karimov government and establishing an Islamic state in the Fergana Valley (Lang, 2013). The IMU then started an organised insurgent campaign against the Uzbek state, funding its activities in Central Asia and other areas primarily through involvement in drug trafficking and support from global Islamist organisations like those in Saudi Arabia. The IMU launched two significant but fruitless attacks (the so-called Batken raids) against the Kyrgyz government in southern Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000 (Falkenburg, 2013).

Founded in 1952, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) seeks to restore the Caliphate, the Islamic state that was formally abolished in 1924 as a result of the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Baran, 2005). Although HuT as an organisation does not engage in terrorist activities, several observers assert that it does function as an ideological vanguard that supports and encourages extremism. HuT has established Kyrgyzstan as its primary base in the region. HuT is a legally acknowledged group in Kyrgyzstan but is outlawed in the other CARs (World Almanack of Islamism, 2019). Jama’at Kyrgyzstan Jaish al-Mahdi, also known as the ‘Kyrgyz Army of the Righteous Ruler’, is another Islamist organisation that mostly operates in Kyrgyzstan. It was founded in 2010 and seeks to create a strict interpretation of Sharia as the cornerstone of Kyrgyz society and law. Other Islamist organisations, such as the Kazakh extremist group Jund al-Khalifah and Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, have their headquarters outside the region but conduct operations there. Both have bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area) region. Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) describes itself as a non-political missionary movement urging Muslims to uphold the beliefs of the early Muslims. TJ was illegal everywhere in the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) nations as well as those that have ratified the SCO Convention on Countering Extremism, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan. However, a lot of regional specialists think it would be ineffective to outlaw TJ because it promotes the liberal Hanafi school of thought, which is opposed to the Wahhabi and Salafi movements (Duysheeva, 2019).

Suppression of Islamist groups and continuation of authoritarianism

Uzbekistan

Since gaining independence in 1991, Uzbekistan has witnessed the emergence of several significant Islamist groups, including the ‘Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’ (IMU), ‘Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami’, and ‘The Islamic Renaissance Party’. The IMU, in particular, is a coalition of Muslim fighters from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian nations who oppose the Uzbek regime. This movement was established in 1998 by Tahir Yoldashev and Juma Namangani following the conclusion of the civil war in Uzbekistan (Rashid, 2002). With the opening of the political space, many Islamic parties and groups were emerged. Tahir Yoldashev sought to establish Sharia law by founding the ‘Adolat Party’. This party made several demands of the government, including the official recognition of Islam as the country’s religion, the allocation of the Namangan building for the Adolat Party’s office, and the acknowledgment of all opposition groups as legitimate political participants within the Uzbekistan political landscape (Abduvakhitov, 1995, p. 297). The government of Uzbekistan perceived these and similar demands as a significant threat. In response to the legitimate demands of opposition groups, the government chose a path of repression. Consequently, some members of the ‘Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’ adopted radical and terrorist approaches. Subsequently, both the ‘Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’ and its precursor, the ‘Adolat Party’, were banned. Many of their leaders and members were arrested. However, the main leaders, Tahir Yoldashev and Juma Namangani, fled to Tajikistan, where they joined Islamist groups involved in the civil war in Tajikistan.

The Uzbek branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was founded in January 1992. However, the government responded to its early peaceful activities with repression, leading to the arrest of many of its members. The party was subsequently banned from engaging in any political activities. Abdujabar Abduvakhitov, an Uzbek scholar, argued that the IRP in Uzbekistan did not promote anti-democratic principles. He further suggested that theoretically, the party was willing to participate in a democratic political process. However, the state responded with repression rather than allowing the party to engage in peaceful political activities (Abduvakhitov, 1993, p. 96).

In the early 1990s, ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir’ entered Central Asia and gradually expanded its membership throughout the region. Unlike the ‘Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’, Hizb ut-Tahrir strictly prohibits the use of violence or armed confrontation. The party maintains that its goals can be achieved through dialogue, political competition, and propaganda against secular governments. Hizb ut-Tahrir believes that social issues such as corruption and poverty can be eliminated by establishing Islam or implementing Sharia law effectively. However, the Uzbek government views Hizb ut-Tahrir as more than just a moderately peaceful organization and considers its claims of advocating dialogue and debate as deceptive. As a result, the government has engaged in severe repression of the party, driving it to operate underground (Khamidov, 2003).

The government of Uzbekistan initially acknowledged the presence of Islam, but over time, it implemented a policy of repression against opposition groups, particularly Islamist organizations. Exploiting the perceived security and military threats posed by these groups, the government created a pretext to suppress and eliminate all Islamic movements (Fierman, 2019). In this situation, the deprivation of people from participating in the political development process, failing to address their demands, and closing all communication channels to express dissent has provided fertile ground for the emergence of extreme views, fueled by the search for lost hopes and dreams. Islamic extremist and fundamentalist groups have become increasingly organized, with the aim of overthrowing the government and reforming affairs (Peimani, 2002, p. 91). The policy of suppressing Islamist groups led to the same result that Islam Karimov feared, namely the emergence of armed Islamic extremism. For example, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which branched off from the banned Adolat Party in 1992, became one of the most powerful Islamist armed parties in Central Asia, and after becoming disillusioned with political activity, it carried out terrorist attacks alternately in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan has ratified a law mandating that all religious groups register with the Ministry of Justice prior to conducting any activities. Failure to register prevents a group from engaging in any form of activity. The law outlines various conditions for registration, including the necessity for groups to maintain a permanent presence in at least eight out of the country’s 14 administrative units for central registration. In 2022, the local branch of the Ministry of Justice required the group to present a membership list comprising a minimum of 50 individuals aged 18 years or older, along with a charter written in Uzbek, and a legal and physical address(Report on International Religious Freedom: Uzbekistan, 2022). Reporting on her visit to Uzbekistan, the UN Special Rapporteur, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, found that Uzbekistan’s ‘broad and vaguely defined’ definitions of terrorism and extremism impinge on the people’s fundamental rights to freedom of thought and expression (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Most scholars maintain that the extremism of this movement is a direct result of the non-recognition of religious freedoms, harsh treatment of opponents, and interruption in the nation-state process due to Islam Karimov’s repressive policies (Rashid, 2002, p. 85).

Tajikistan

Since gaining independence, the most significant Islamist group in Tajikistan has been the ‘Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan’. Among Islamic radical currents in Central Asia, Tajikistan has experienced relatively less fundamental extremism due to the moderate orientations of the Islamic Movement Party. The founder of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, Seyyed Abdullah Nouri, is one of the most renowned religious scholars in Central Asia. He established the initial core of the movement in utmost secrecy in 1974, with a close group of five associates. Following the tumultuous changes after the collapse of the Soviet Union, political power in Tajikistan was seized by Rahmon Nabiyev, the former leader of the Communist Party, in 1991. This swiftly escalated political tensions in Tajikistan, leading to Tashkent falling under the control of coalition forces led by the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan. Consequently, a civil war erupted in the country. Russia and Uzbekistan launched attacks against Nouri’s loyalists, in collaboration with Nabiyev’s forces, ultimately recapturing Tashkent on 24 October 1992. This resulted in the loss of thousands of civilian and military lives, with thousands more seeking refuge in the capital, Dushanbeh. The Tajik government managed to bring the situation under fragile control with the assistance of Russia and Uzbekistan. Despite the official cessation of hostilities, guerrilla warfare persisted sporadically in various parts of the country (Epkenhans, 2016). Finally, after the government’s unsuccessful attempts to quell the Islamists and under pressure from international organizations, government officials and leaders of the opposition forces convened at the negotiating table to achieve national reconciliation. With the mediation of Iran, these negotiations led to the establishment of national reconciliation and the signing of a peace agreement on 27 June 1994, between President Emomali Rahmon and Seyyed Abdullah Nouri. Subsequently, a national committee was formed to oversee the transitional period. According to the provisions of the peace agreement, refugees were granted the right to return to the country, and military combatants were to be disarmed and integrated into the country’s political-military system. Over 6000 fighters were enlisted into the army and border guard forces, and approximately 30% of the country’s administrative positions were filled by individuals associated with the Islamic movement (Facts and Details, 2024).

However, over time, this process became distorted and misused. In the 1999 referendum, Imam Ali Rahmon was re-elected as the president of Tajikistan for a 7-year term. Subsequently, on 27 March 2000, the Tajikistan Parliament, in coordination with the government, declared the conclusion of the peace process and terminated the mission of the National Committee tasked with resolving disputes. Following this, the government initiated a consolidation of power by deviating from the provisions of the peace agreement with the ‘Islamic Movement of Tajikistan’, effectively sidelining the Islamists from positions of authority (Gleason, 2002, pp. 5–6).

Finally, on 4 September 2015, following the uprising led by General Abdul Halim Nazarzadeh, then Deputy Minister of Defence of Tajikistan, the Tajikistan government accused the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan of collaborating with the rebel general in a plot to overthrow the government. By the autumn of 2015, the activities of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, the sole political-Islamic organization officially active in the former Soviet Union and which had resumed its official activities based on the 1997 peace treaty, were banned and designated as a terrorist entity. Thirteen members of the party’s leadership were arrested, with two deputy leaders sentenced to life imprisonment and the remaining members receiving sentences ranging from 15 to 28 years in prison. In total, over one hundred activists of the party were incarcerated, with reports of some being subjected to torture while in detention. The party’s regional offices were shuttered, and the assets of both the party and its members were confiscated. Additionally, discussion of the Islamic Renaissance Party in domestic media was prohibited. Mohiuddin Kabiri, the leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party, who had travelled abroad before the formal ban, did not return to Tajikistan in exile. He announced in a statement that the Islamic Renaissance Party had no role in ‘General Nazarzadeh’s action’ and that this issue was a pretext for Imam Ali Rahman’s government to create an excuse to suppress his opponents (Borisov, 2015). He also stressed that their party is against this Islamic state and Islamic radicalism (Pannier, 2015).

This process of combating Islamists entered a new phase after the events of 11 September 2001. For example, according to the decision of the Supreme Court of Tajikistan, since 2001, all Islamist groups, both moderate and extreme, have been labelled as extremist and terrorist organisations, whose activities have been banned in the territory of Tajikistan. The intensification of the new round of repression was doubled with the approval of the Religious Restrictions Law in March 2009, and since then, the country’s policies towards Islamic groups have entered a new phase, and many people affiliated with Islamist groups have been arrested and imprisoned (Lozovsky, 2018). Sabze Ali Mohammad Rezayev, head of the Islamic Movement Party in Badakhshan, was also assassinated during the operation of the Tajik security forces to suppress the armed opposition in Khorog City, Badakhshan province. Other people who accepted responsibility as representatives of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan in Badakhshan in the following years were not spared from persecution. The conflict with militants in 2013, coupled with the crackdown on Islamist opposition, escalated to such an extent that some observers labeled it the second civil war in Tajikistan. Repression of opponents through methods such as assassination, torture in detention centers and prisons, and denial of access to legal representation are among the tactics employed against dissidents and Islamists in Tajikistan. The surge in reports of torture in Tajikistan led to protests, prompting the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan Mendez, to visit the country in 2012 and 2014 to investigate the issue of torture in Tajik prisons (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

In recent years, Tajikistan has implemented a ban on 17 Islamist groups, which encompass both violent extremist groups and moderately political Islamist organizations. It has also imposed additional restrictions on religious practices. Tajikistan’s government has adopted the National Strategy on Countering Extremism and Terrorism for the period of 2016–2020. This strategy is to prevent the radicalization and recruitment of vulnerable youths, both men and women, into radical These measures are intended to mitigate the risks associated with extremism and terrorism within Tajikistan. The most important reason cited by the Tajik authorities to fight against Islamic groups is to prevent the spread of extremist ideas and, as a result, terrorism. But the reality is that the president of Tajikistan and the ruling group rarely tolerate opposition and want to maintain their control over power. As a result, they nip any potential opposition in the bud. A person may now be arrested for a minor infraction of the dictated manner of dressing and shaving, or for having a beard. Internet and telephone conversations are under strict control, and many social networks can only be accessed using an anti-filter. All these measures have led to the radicalization of Islamist groups that were peaceful in the beginning (Pannier, 2015).

Kazakhstan

In its nation-building efforts, the new republic, led by President Nursultan Nazarbayev, sought to cultivate ‘Kazakh Islam’ that combined pre-Soviet Tengrianism with a moderate Hanafi Sunni Islamic interpretation. The state-endorsed version of Islam was promoted by the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan (SAMK), established as an independent muftiate in 1990. Although 70% of the population identified themselves as Muslim in the 2009 census, the Kazakh political elites appeared to engage in more of a ‘gestural recognition of [Islam] as an element of the new national identity’ (Yemelianova, 2014, p. 8). In public rhetoric, the terms ‘faith’ and ‘religion’ were often preferred over the explicit use of ‘Islam’ (Laruelle, 2015), despite the majority Muslim population. Notably, the 2010 Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan, a declaration of the nation’s values, does not make any mention of Islam (Baizakova & McDermott, 2015). Therefore, as Utomo (2017) argues, in the secular republic, Islam was utilised as a resource for cultural continuity and identity, while the government also saw Islam as a threat and to be kept separate from political affairs. Kazakhstan’s constitution explicitly prohibits the formation of religious political parties. Nonetheless, among the political movements in the post-independence period, the Alash National Party stood out for its alignment with Islamic values. Established in 1990, the group’s vision aimed at establishing an Islamic Turkic state with Islam as the official religion and the establishment of a truly independent muftiate. Disagreements over the leadership of SAMK led to the arrest and subsequent exile of key party leaders, including its founder, Aron Atabek. This ultimately resulted in the organisation’s dissolution in 1994 (Achilov, 2015).

Despite experiencing a less intensive Islamic revival compared to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the post-1991 period in Kazakhstan witnessed a rapid surge in the construction of mosques and universities, financed by foreign Muslim countries such as the Gulf States and Egypt. This growth has been substantial, with the number of mosques in Kazakhstan increasing from 68 in 1991 to 2752 today (Mustafayeva et al., 2023). One notable development during this period was the establishment of the Egyptian University of Islamic Culture, Nur-Mubarak, in Almaty in 2003. These institutions benefited from foreign financing and were often staffed by foreign-born imams and lecturers, reflecting a liberal openness to Islamic perspectives from overseas. Beisenov (2023) gives the example of the poet and founder of the Asyl Arna TV channel, Mukhamedzhan Tazabek. Having himself spent time in Saudi Arabia, the channel has been promoting Salafist interpretations of Islam since it was founded in 2007.

Growing concerns about extremist influences from within the Central Asian region prompted the state to adopt a more cautious approach in the early 2000s. In alignment with America’s ‘Global War on Terror’, Kazakhstan’s Anti-Terrorist Centre conducted counter-terrorism raids and deported 36 foreign preachers between 2003 and 2006 (Yemelianova, 2014). In 2004, several Islamic groups that had become increasingly active in the country since the 1990s were banned, including the IMU, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and Jamaat of Central Asia Mujahedins. However, there was a noticeable intensification in the securitization of ‘untraditional’ forms of Islam, particularly the Salafist and Wahhabist branches, during the 2010s. This shift was catalyzed by a series of terrorist attacks that occurred in the country between 2011 and 2012. These attacks, which predominantly targeted state security forces, were attributed to Jund al-Khilafah, a radical group with connections to Pakistan and Afghanistan. A primary driver behind these attacks was the perceived infringement on religious freedom within Kazakhstan.

In response to these security challenges, Kazakhstan ushered in a new era of stringent counterterrorism measures. The 2011 Law on Religious Activities and Religious Associations played a pivotal role in this transformation. This legislation banned public prayers in buildings and workplaces, criminalised unregistered religious activities, and imposed more rigorous registration requirements, effectively rendering numerous religious organisations illegal. By 2012, only the Nur-Mubarak University in Almaty remained the sole Islamic university in the country (Yemelianova, 2014). Additionally, the dissemination of religious materials came under the purview of the Agency for Religious Affairs, established in 2011, which also oversaw the closure of various websites and media outlets, including the Ayra TV channel, which ceased operations in 2020. Furthermore, Kazakh students were prohibited from enrolling in foreign religious institutions without prior authorization from the Ministry of Education.

Sharipova argues the securitization efforts aimed at undesirable forms of Islam have inadvertently made it more challenging to gauge the extent of adherence to these ideologies within the country; ‘the authorities cannot state the exact number of those who are following this ideology in the country’ (2021, p. 8). Despite the introduction of a substantial $900 million anti-radicalization programme in 2018, the country’s approach remains predominantly focused on countering radicalism originating from external sources. This perspective is evident in the state’s response to the recent political unrest in 2022, where it attributed the upheaval to ‘foreign-trained Islamic radicals’ (South China Morning Post, 2022). This approach suggests that Kazakhstan continues to view radicalism primarily through the lens of external influence and intervention, rather than acknowledging the potential role of grievances against the state or the unforeseen consequences of limitations on freedom of religion and comprehensive political participation. It can be seen that the constraints on religious freedom to eliminate political opposition have been counterproductive. As Kurmashev et al. argue, this threat of extremism is the result of ‘security and liberty issues arising for the public when the state is attempting to ensure the protection of its citizens through surveillance operations’ (2018, p. 126). Concerns regarding authoritarianism, freedom of religion, and corruption led to terrorist attacks in 2010–2011 and 2016. With more repression following these incidents, the threat of radicalism in Kazakhstan continues to rise. Between 2020 and 2021, there was an increase of nearly 20% in terrorism-related prosecutions in the country (United States State Department, 2021).

Turkmenistan

In Turkmenistan, religion in public life has progressively come under the ever-tightening grip of the state since the country gained independence in 1991. The embodiment of ‘Turkmen Islam’, primarily Hanafi interpretation intertwined with traditional Turkmen cultural beliefs, was vividly demonstrated by the republic’s inaugural president, Saparmurat Atayevich Niyazov. He leveraged traditional Islam as a vehicle for conserving cultural continuity, inaugurating his tenure by taking the oath of office with the Quran. In a significant historical milestone in 1992, he became the first leader from a Central Asian Republic to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca. However, despite these outward displays of faith, the government was gradually exerting strict control over the role of Islam in public life through the Council of Religious Affairs (Geneshi), which meticulously scrutinised all Imams in the country and held substantial influence as the country’s religious regulatory body. Through the Geneshi, it was mandated that every mosque be forced to display copies of the President’s spiritual-nationalistic book, the Ruhnama (Body of the Soul), in mosques and use quotations from the book during sermons. Those clerics who criticized the promotion of this book were punished. In 1997, over half of the almost 90 mosques had to close due to not cooperating with the state (Peyrouse, 2015). The extent of state control over the imams can be seen by the imprisonment and 26-year sentencing of Nasrullah ibn-Ibadullah, the Mufti of Turkmenistan, in 2003 (Blua, 2003). An ethnic Uzbek, ibn-Ibadullah, had undertaken studies in Uzbekistan and Cairo and was sentenced to 26 years imprisonment in a closed trial, reportedly for opposing the presence of the Ruhnama in mosques. Following his removal, he was replaced by an ethnic Turkmen, Kakageldi Wepaýew (Clement, 2020).

Despite opening its doors to foreign funding for mosques and educational institutions, there remained a deep suspicion of foreign influences on Turkmen religious and public life. Turkmenistan had three madrasas for theological training in the 1990s: Dashoguz, Turkmenabat, and Ashgat. By 2001, only the theological department in the State University of Ashgabat remained, which was later merged with the department of history in 2005, with the number of students drastically limited (Peyrouse, 2015). In 2003, a law was passed forcing Islamic institutions to report financial assistance from foreign sources (United States State Department, 2006), and in 2005, a government decree was issued declaring that all foreign qualifications were not recognised by the government and forbidding students to travel abroad for foreign study.

Following President Niyazov’s death in 2006, pervasive elements of his personality cult were rolled back, and reforms for civic liberties were promised (Sullivan, 2015). However, state institutions tightly controlling religion persisted. Turkmen pilgrims to the Hajj have historically been limited by the state. In 2005, the Turkmen government allowed fewer than 5% of the 4600 granted permission by Saudi Arabia to travel (Corley, 2006). Heavy vetting of applicants and mobility restrictions on pilgrims continued into President Berdymuhammedov’s regime. In 2009, no citizens were granted permission by the Turkmen officials to travel to Mecca for Hajj (Central Eurasia Project, 2010).

In recent years, Turkmenistan has been involved in the imprisonment of numerous Muslims based on vague accusations of ‘extremism’. These individuals are often subjected to secret trials, and once incarcerated, they are frequently denied contact with their relatives. Disturbingly, many of these prisoners have reported instances of torture. An incident that occurred in 2019 sheds light on the climate of fear and control in Turkmenistan. In the city of Balkanabat, a Muslim individual ceased attending the mosque after being summoned by the police. During the interrogation, officers posed the question, ‘Who is more important, Allah or the President?’ This incident highlights the pressure placed on individuals to prioritise loyalty to the president over their religious beliefs. Turkmen diplomats, particularly in countries with a significant number of Turkmen students like Belarus, Ukraine, and Turkey, frequently summon students to caution them about their behavior. These warnings often include instructions to refrain from attending mosques or, in the case of men, to avoid growing beards. Imams in Turkmenistan have long been required to express praise for the president during Friday prayers, call upon Muslims to support him, and offer prayers for his well-being. This requirement emphasises the government’s expectation of religious leaders to demonstrate unwavering loyalty to the President (Forum 18, 2019). Overall, these accounts illustrate a climate of restricted religious freedom, control, and surveillance in Turkmenistan, where individuals face persecution and imprisonment based on vague charges of extremism while enduring significant violations of their human rights. However, despite the repressive approach, Islam has gained popularity among both ordinary and elite Turkmen. For example, many Turkmen parents are naming their babies Arabic or Islamic names. In addition, not only ordinary Turkmen but also elites, pop stars, artists, and well-known bloggers have begun to promote Islam and share Quranic quotes on a regular basis. Fasting during the month of Ramadan has also gained popularity (Amanov, 2022). Such a strong cultural tendency can easily convert to political Islam.

Publicly available data on the existence of Islamic extremists in Turkmenistan is hard to come by due to the closed political and media environment in the country. The isolationist nature of Turkmenistan and its status as a single-party state have led many to compare it with North Korea. There is no space for civil society groups to have a say outside of the domain of the state. Nor is there an alternative form of Islam outside of the official Islam dictated by the state. Many Muslims live in fear of practicing even the most fundamental of practices, such as Ramadam. The inability of citizens to have a say in living their values has undoubtedly pushed them to follow more extreme paths. Although the government of Turkmenistan has not commented on this, around 400 Turkmen citizens are estimated to have fought for ISIS. Therefore, the lack of available routes for self-expression has led to further extremism and violence.

Kyrgyzstan

The Ferghana Valley, a densely populated region shared by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, has long been known as a fertile ground for conservative Islam and a recruitment hub for various Islamic groups. Among these groups, Hizb-ut-Tahrir made its debut in Kyrgyzstan in 1997, initially attracting primarily ethnic Uzbeks. However, over time, its influence expanded to include ethnic Kyrgyz as well. In the early 2000s, the number of Hizb-ut-Tahrir supporters in Kyrgyzstan was relatively small, but it surged to as many as 8000 supporters by 2009 (Omelicheva, 2010). In the early years of independence, Kyrgyzstan adopted a relatively moderate and open approach to accommodating various Islamic perspectives. However, following the armed incursions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1999 and 2000 in the southern region of the country, the government shifted its stance. These IMU attacks involved militants infiltrating Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan and resulted in the abduction of numerous hostages. Unable to cope with the military challenge, the Kyrgyz government sought assistance from Uzbekistan and Russia to suppress the IMU threat. In response to these incursions, Kyrgyzstan initiated a crackdown on interpretations of Islam that diverged from the state-endorsed orthodoxy. Despite their non-violent approach, the Kyrgyz government took a stringent stance by banning the group in 2003, leading to Hizb-ut-Tahrir continuing its activities in an underground capacity.

Despite Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s non-violent approach, the Kyrgyz government took a stringent stance by banning the group in 2003, leading to the group continuing its activities in an underground capacity. Extremists from the Uighur ethnic community, which makes claims of being denied rights in northwest China’s Xinjiang province, carried out a terrorist attack on the Chinese embassy in Bishkek in 2016 rather than an Islamist organisation with a target on Kyrgyzstan (Kucera, 2016, September 6). Nevertheless, a lot of political upheaval and protest in Central Asia have been nonviolent, including the Tulip Revolution in March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan that toppled President Akayev over allegations of corruption. In the Ferghana valley’s Osh and Jalal Abad, part of Kyrgyzstan, there is a noticeable militant element.

Following the Tulip Revolution in 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiyev assumed the presidency and promised increased political and religious freedoms. However, there has been a gradual erosion of these rights in Kyrgyzstan, and significant crackdowns on dissent and religious diversity have also unfolded during this period. Notably, the historically influential Kamalov family in Osh found themselves targeted by government authorities. They openly criticised the Kyrgyz muftiate, the state-sanctioned religious authority. One member of this family, Muhammadrafik Kamalov, who served as an imam in KaraSuu, was killed during a counter-terrorism operation in 2006. His son subsequently assumed the role of imam but later found himself imprisoned in 2015 for violating extremist laws (Engvall, 2020). On 1 October 2009, clashes between several hundred local Muslims and the security services occurred after authorities refused to allow the celebration of Orozo Ait (Eid al Fitr). As a result of the unrest, 32 people were given long prison sentences for their role in the clashes (Khamidov, 2017).

In 2009, the Kyrgyz Parliament enacted a new law that imposed stricter regulations on the registration of mosques and seminaries, along with the requirement for imams to undergo periodic testing to ensure religious compliance. Paradoxically, these stricter measures on Islamic beliefs seemed to contribute to the growth of conservative Islamic sentiment. A survey conducted in 2013 found that 35% of Kyrgyzstan respondents expressed support for Sharia law, a proportion higher than that reported in Tajikistan or Kazakhstan (Pew Research Center, 2013). Simultaneously, there was a concerning trend of Kyrgyz citizens joining extremist groups abroad. Some ventured to Iraq and Syria to fight for organisations like ISIL, while others were involved in planning terrorist attacks, notably in Bishkek during 2015 and 2016. Despite the government’s efforts, groups like Hizb-ut-Tahrir have proven resilient. Members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir continue to be apprehended and arrested, illustrating that government policies alone have not eradicated these groups. The rise of the internet has also facilitated the dissemination of non-state-approved Islamic ideologies. A survey-based study of religious trends among youth discovered that Salafist Islamic ideas are more commonly encountered online than in-person Islamic gatherings (Nasritdinov et al. 2019). Recent research suggests that despite the repressive policies implemented by Girgis State, there has been a consistent increase in the number of individuals being radicalised and recruited by extremist or terrorist organisations like ISIS in this particular country. As of March 2020, it is estimated that approximately 10% of the country’s youth population has fallen under the influence of radicalization, with 6% actively involved in the process of radicalization and 4% already identified as violent extremists, terrorists, former foreign fighters, or potential jihadists. Although the overall number of active jihadists in Kyrgyzstan may be relatively small, the country has ranked first in Central Asia in terms of per capita involvement. In 2017 alone, over a thousand individuals volunteered to join jihadist fighters abroad, showcasing the significant support for and active recruitment into groups like ‘IS Khorasan’ in Afghanistan. The non-tolerant attitude of the Kyrgyz government towards any kind of political Islamism as well as economic instability and socio-ethnic conflicts within Kyrgyzstan have contributed to its transformation into a focal point for radicalization and jihadism (Hochberg-Marom, 2022).

Conclusion

In Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the governments are predominantly led by presidents with authoritarian styles, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, which transitioned from a presidential system to a parliamentary system in 2010. Across all Central Asian countries, presidential power is strong, and the constitutions have been tailored to serve the incumbent presidents who have been elected successively. According to the classification by ‘Freedom House’, which categorizes political regimes based on levels of freedom, all five countries in the region were classified as ‘not-free’ in 2022 (Freedom House, 2023). This status has generally been consistent since their independence.

A characteristic of authoritarian countries is the suppression of any viable opposition. Islamist groups, particularly those of a moderate nature, often find support within Muslim communities due to their emphasis on social justice and historical identity. However, authoritarian governments tend to label all Islamist groups as radical and deal with them in a blanket manner. This approach, however, fails to address the underlying issues and instead transforms the problem from a peaceful one to an underground and violent one. If peaceful conditions for political competition were provided to moderate Islamists, many individuals would realize that their proposed solutions to economic problems are not magical. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, due to the lack of political development and the persistence of authoritarianism in the CARs, emerging groups, especially moderate Islamists, were not integrated into the political system and were not recognized as legitimate political actors. Their severe repression has led to significant frustration, as they are disillusioned with the possibility of engaging in peaceful political activities through legal and official channels. Consequently, some turned to rebellious behaviors, such as embracing extreme Islamism as espoused by ISIS. While the Islamic political parties of Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan are presently among the most active and influential Islamic organizations in Central Asia, the harsh suppression of Islamic groups by their governments, particularly after September 11, has forced many of these groups to operate underground and engage in extreme activities. However, the perpetuation of political authoritarianism and the repression of moderate Islamist groups do not eliminate the reality of Islamism in Central Asia; instead, their activities become covert, secretive, focused on charity work, and occasionally extremist in nature. If certain conditions are met, they may even have the potential to seize power.

It should be acknowledged that the authors’ experience as scholars in the CARs show that the majority of Central Asia’s residents are secular, moderate Muslims who seem satisfied with the way things are, as most have not experienced severe economic hardship or cruel tyranny. A new generation of Muslims is working to rid the community of its exclusive and sectarian mindset by focusing on issues that directly impact their daily lives: security, employment, housing, and education. They are fed up with a minority of close-minded mullahs and other so-called Muslim ‘leaders’ that do not represent their views and beliefs. This new generation communicates in a contemporary language and with their understanding of Islam, emphasising diversity and tolerance. This generation is characterised by its high level of enthusiasm for the future, as well as its open-mindedness and self-assurance. They tend to view Salafi and Wahhabi philosophy, based on the rigorous Hanbali interpretation of Sharia, with suspicion because they are Sunni Muslims and generally adhere to the Hanafi school of Islamic law. They do, however, make concessions on certain practices that are explicitly defined within the Hanafi jurisdiction. The Hanafi school of jurisprudence places a higher emphasis on the use of reasoning and analogy (qiyas) rather than strictly adhering to literal interpretations of texts. This approach often results in more flexible verdicts. This adaptability has occasionally been linked to a more ‘progressive’ approach, especially in domains such as personal status legislation and commercial affairs. Nevertheless, it is crucial to acknowledge that understandings and customs within each branch of Islamic legal theory can diverge significantly due to factors like as cultural circumstances, historical progressions, and the impact of specific scholars. Moreover, the labels ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ tend to be overly simplistic when used to describe religious traditions, which cover a diverse array of ideas and practices. The political authorities in the Central Asian Republics should effectively utilise the enthusiasm and resolve of the upcoming Muslim generations to enhance the political and public spheres. Instead of implementing counterproductive policies that restrict religious expression out of fear and suspicion, they should embrace more constructive approaches.

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Notes on contributors

Ali Omidi

Ali Omidi is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran. He has an extensive background in academia and research, having published numerous articles, books, and analyses on topics such as Iranian foreign policy, Middle East politics, and International Relations. Ali Omidi’s expertise has been recognized through prestigious fellowships awarded to him by institutions like SIPRI in Stockholm and UNITAR in The Hague. He has actively participated in various international conferences and events, further contributing to the academic discourse in his field. Along with his teachings and research on Middle East Politics, the topic of political Islamism and international conflicts attracted his attention and the present article has been developed along those studies. Due to his expertise, he is often sought after for interviews and consultations on Iranian foreign policy by local, national, and international media outlets.

Kashif Hasan Khan

Kashif Hasan Khan holds the position of Associate Professor at the Economics Department of Ala-Too International University in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Kashif has previously held positions as an Assistant Professor in Konya, Turkey, an International Business Consultant in Manila, the Philippines, and a Consultant Economist with the Asian Development Bank. He has authored numerous publications on various topics related to Central Asia, including connectivity, political economy, economic corridors, and development economics. In this paper, the author and his coauthors offer insights into the interrelation between political repression and the emergence of Islamic radicalism, highlighting how repressive actions typically intensify radicalization. The paper examines this self-perpetuating cycle, enhancing our comprehension of the wider framework in which our study is conducted. It emphasizes the pressing requirement for sophisticated strategies to tackle political instability and extremism in Central Asia.

Oskar Schortz

Oskar Schortz is a doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford, where he specializes in Social Anthropology. For his PhD project, he is examining the post socialist transformations in Central Asia, with a particular focus on trade, entrepreneurship and moral life. The research undertaken for this paper is part of his attempt to understand the longer term cultural trends following independence, and how these developments affect the everyday lives of citizens in the region. The religious revival across Central Asia following independence provided opportunities for moral development and growth for ordinary citizens. However, at the same time, the political reaction to religious activities, especially from the early 2000s, restricted these moral projects in favour of security and political control.