Feeble rules: one dual-use sanctions regime, multiple ways of implementation and application?

References

• Abbott, K.W. and Snidal, D., 1998. Why states act through formal international organizations. Journal of conflict resolution, 42 (1), 3–32.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Alavi, H. and Khamichonak, T., 2017. EU and US export control regimes for dual use goods: an overview of existing frameworks. Romanian journal of European affairs, 17 (1), 59–74.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• BBC. 2017. How BAE sold cyber-surveillance tools to Arab states. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40276568 [Accessed 24 September 2020].
   Google Scholar
• Bapat, N.A. and Morgan, T.C., 2009. Multilateral versus unilateral sanctions reconsidered: a test using new data. International studies quarterly, 53 (4), 1075–1094.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boogaerts, A., 2018a. An effective sanctioning actor? Merging effectiveness and EU actorness criteria to explain evolutions in (in)effective coercion towards Iran. European security, 27 (2), 138–157.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boogaerts, A., 2018b. Beyond norms: a configurational analysis of the EU’s Arab Spring sanctions. Foreign policy analysis, 14 (3), 408–428.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Börzel, T., et al., 2010. Obstinate and inefficient: why Member States do not comply with European law. Comparative political studies, 43 (11), 1363–1390.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bräuner, O., 2013. Beyond the arms embargo: EU transfers of defense and dual-use technologies to China. Journal of east Asian studies, 13 (3), 457–482.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Byers, M., 2020. Still agreeing to disagree: international security and constructive ambiguity. Journal on the use of force and international law. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2020.1761656.
   Google Scholar
• Carbone, M., 2008. Mission impossible: the European Union and policy coherence for development. Journal of European integration, 30 (3), 323–342.
   Google Scholar
• Cardwell, P.J., 2015. The legalisation of European Union Foreign Policy and the use of sanctions. Cambridge yearbook of European legal studies, 17, 287–310.
   Google Scholar
• Commission. 2013a. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2013) 710 final. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0710:FIN:EN:PDF [Accessed 30 March 2020].
   Google Scholar
• Commission. 2013b. Commission staff working document: strategic export controls: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world – a report on the public consultation launched under the green paper COM(2011) 393. SWD(2013) 7 final, Brussels.
   Google Scholar
• Commission. 2015. Final report: data and information collection for EU dual-use export control policy review. Available from: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/september/tradoc_154962.PDF [Accessed 16 April 2020].
   Google Scholar
• Commission. 2016. Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the council setting up a union regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering, technical assistance and transit of dual-use items (recast). Available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2016/0616/COM_COM(2016)0616_EN.pdf [Accessed 15 April 2020].
   Google Scholar
• Commission. 2019. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2019) 562 final. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2019/EN/COM-2019-562-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF [Accessed 26 May 2020].
   Google Scholar
• de Vries, A.W. and Hazelzet, H., 2005. The EU as a new actor on the sanctions scene. In: P. Wallensteen and C. Staibano, eds. International sanctions: between words and wars in the global system. Abington: Routledge, 95–107.
   Google Scholar
• Drezner, D.W., 2000. Bargaining, enforcement, and multilateral sanctions: when is cooperation counterproductive? International organization, 54 (1), 73–102.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Druláková, R. and Zemanová, Š, 2020. Why the implementation of multilateral sanctions does (not) work: lessons learned from the Czech Republic. European security. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2020.1766448.
   Google Scholar
• Early, B., 2009. Sleeping with your friends’ enemies: an explanation of sanctions-busting trade. International studies quarterly, 53 (1), 49–71.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Early, B., 2015. Busted sanctions. Explaining why economic sanctions fail. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Early, B.R. and Spice, R., 2015. Economic sanctions, international institutions, and sanctions busters: when does institutionalized cooperation help sanctioning efforts? Foreign policy analysis, 11 (3), 339–360.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Eckes, C., 2014. EU restrictive measures against natural and legal persons: From counterterrorist to third country sanctions. Common Market Law Review, 51 (3), 869–905.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Eeckhout, P., 2004. External relations of the European Union: legal and constitutional foundations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Falkner, G., et al., 2005. Complying with Europe: EU harmonisation and soft law in the Member States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Giumelli, F., 2017. The redistributive impact of restrictive measures on EU members: winners and losers from imposing sanctions on Russia. Journal of common market studies, 55 (5), 1062–1080.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Giumelli, F., 2018. The role of for-profit actors in implementing targeting sanctions: the case of the European Union. In: O. Bures and H. Carrapico, eds. Security privatization; how non-security-related private businesses shape security governance. Cham: Springer, 123–141.
   Google Scholar
• Giumelli, F., Hoffmann, F., and Książczaková, A., 2020. The when, what, where and why of European Union sanctions. European security. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2020.1797685.
   Google Scholar
• Golumbic, C.E. and Ruff III, R.S., 2013. Why do I call for an EU sanctions exemption?: Why the EU economic sanctions regime should centralize licensing. Georgetown journal of international law, 44, 1007–1053.
   Google Scholar
• Hawkins, D.G., et al., 2006. Delegation and agency in international organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hooghe, L. and Marks, G., 2015. Delegation and pooling in international organizations. Review of international organizations, 10 (3), 305–328.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Interview #1. 2019. Official of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Berlin, Germany, September 2019.
   Google Scholar
• Kenis, P. and Schneider, V., 1987. The EC as an international corporate actor: two case studies in economic diplomacy. European journal of political research, 15 (4), 437–457.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Koremenos, B., 2008. When, what, and why do states choose to delegate? Law and contemporary problems, 71 (1), 151–192.
   Google Scholar
• Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., and Snidal, D., 2001. The rational design of international institutions. International organization, 55 (4), 761–799.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Koutrakos, P., 2001. Trade, foreign policy and defence in EU Constitutional Law: the legal regulation of sanctions, exports of dual-use goods and armaments. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Koutrakos, P., 2006. EU international relations law. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Kranz, K., 2016. European Union arms embargoes: the relationship between institutional design and norms. Cambridge review of international affairs, 29 (3), 970–996.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kreutz, J., 2015. Human rights, geostrategy, and EU Foreign Policy, 1989-2008. International organization, 69 (1), 195–217.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lake, D.A., 2007. Delegating divisible sovereignty: sweeping a conceptual minefield. Review of international organizations, 2 (3), 219–337.
   Google Scholar
• Micara, A.G., 2012. Current features of the European Union regime for export control of dual-use goods. Journal of common market studies, 50 (4), 578–593.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McAuley, J. and Noack, R., 2018. Germany will stop arms sales to Saudis; allies ponder whether to follow suit. The Washington Post, 23 Oct, A10.
   Google Scholar
• Moore, M., 2010. Arming the embargoed: a supply-side understanding of arms embargo violations. Journal of conflict resolution, 54 (4), 593–615.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• OJ C 67/1. 2012. Notices from Member States: Information Note: Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 Setting up a community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items: information on measures adopted by Member States in conformity with Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 17 and 22. OJ EU.
   Google Scholar
• OJ C 51/8. 2015. Notices from Member States: Information Note: Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May Setting up a community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items: information on measures adopted by Member States in conformity with Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 17 and 22. OJ EU.
   Google Scholar
• OJ C 304/3. 2016. Notices from Member States: Information Note: Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 Setting up a community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items: information on measures adopted by Member States in conformity with Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 17 and 22. OJ EU.
   Google Scholar
• OJ C 16/4. 2020. Notices from Member States: Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 Setting up a community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items: Information on measures adopted by Member States in conformity with Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 17 and 22. OJ EU.
   Google Scholar
• Pollack, M.A., 1997. Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European community. International organization, 51 (1), 99–134.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Portela, C., 2010. European Union sanctions and foreign policy: when and why do they work? Abingdon: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Portela, C., 2015. Member States resistance to EU Foreign Policy sanctions. European foreign affairs review, 20 (Special Issue), 39–62.
   Google Scholar
• Portela, C. and Orbie, J., 2014. Sanctions under the EU generalised system of preferences and foreign policy: coherence by accident? Contemporary politics, 20 (1), 63–76.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sjursen, H. and Rosén, G., 2017. Arguing sanctions. On the EU’s response to the crisis in Ukraine. Journal of common market studies, 55 (1), 20–36.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Szymanski, M. and Smith, M.E., 2005. Coherence and conditionality in European Foreign Policy: negotiating the EU-Mexico Global Agreement. Journal of common market studies, 43 (1), 171–192.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tallberg, J., 2010. Explaining the institutional foundations of European Union negotiations. Journal of European public policy, 17 (5), 633–647.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Treib, O., 2014. Implementing and complying with EU governance outputs. Living reviews in European governance, 9 (1), 5–47.
   Google Scholar
• Urbanski, K., 2020. The European Union and International Sanctions: A Model of Emerging Actorness. Edward Elgar Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Urbanski, K. and Meissner, K. L., 2020. The EU as an (In-)Coherent Security Actor? Assessing the Revised Dual-Use Regulation. RSCAS Policy Paper 05. Florence, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
   Google Scholar
• Ward, C., 2005. The counter-terrorism committee; its relevance for implementing targeted sanctions. In: P. Wallensteen and C. Staibano, eds. International sanctions: between words and wars in the global system. Abington: Routledge, 167–180.
   Google Scholar
• Weber, P. and Schneider, G., 2020. Post-Cold War sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US: introducing the EUSANCT dataset. Conflict management and peace science. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894220948720.
   Google Scholar
• Weber, P. and Stępień, B., 2019. Passive, aggressive or creative? Adjustment strategies of companies affected by sanctions. In: R. Van Tulder, A. Verbeke, and B. Jankowska, eds. International business in a VUCA world: the changing role of states and firms. Emerald Publishing, 131–156.
   Google Scholar