References
- Anderson, D.L., 2010. The Vietnam war and its enduring historial relevance. In: D.L. Anderson, ed.. The Columbia history of the Vietnam war (pp. 1–89). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Arreguín-Toft, I., 2005. How the weak win wars: a theory of asymmetric conflict. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Art, R.J. and Cronin, P.M., Eds., 2003. The United States and Coercive diplomacy. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace.
- Auten, J.M., III, 2012. Counterinsurgency: clear-hold-build and the Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan (Command and General Staff College (CGSC), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) monograph). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army, School of Advanced Military Studies Monographs.
- Baltrusaitis, D.F., 2008. Friends indeed? Coalition burden sharing and the war in Iraq. Washington DC: ProQuest. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a486141.pdf
- Bar‐Siman‐Tov, Y., 1980. Alliance strategy: U.S. ‐ small allies relationships. Journal of Strategic Studies, 3, 202–216. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398008437046
- Berman, E., and Lake, D.A., (eds). 2019. Proxy Wars: Suppressing Transnational Violence through Local Agents. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Biddle, S., 2013. Ending the war in Afghanistan: how to avoid failure on the installment plan. Foreign Aff, 92, 49.
- Boettcher, W.A. and Cobb, M.D., 2006. Echoes of Vietnam? Casualty framing and public perceptions of success and failure in Iraq. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50, 831–854. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002706293665
- Boettcher, W.A. and Cobb, M.D., 2009. “Don’t let them die in Vain” casualty frames and public tolerance for escalating commitment in Iraq. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53, 677–697. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709339047
- Byman, D.L., 2006. Friends like these: counterinsurgency and the war on terrorism. International Security, 31, 79–115. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.79
- Callwell, C.E. 1996. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. University of Nebraska Press.
- Choharis, P.C. and Gavrilis, J.A., 2010. Counterinsurgency 3.0. Parameters, 40, 34.
- Choi, A., 2012. Fighting to the finish: democracy and commitment in coalition war. Security Studies, 21, 624–653. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2012.734232
- Christia, F., 2012. Alliance formation in civil wars. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Cooper, C.L., et al., 1972. The American experience with Pacification in Vietnam - Volume I - An overview of pacification. Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses.
- Cooper, H., 2009. In leaning on Karzai, U.S. has limited leverage. N. Y. Times.
- Cornish, P., 2009. The United States and counterinsurgency: ‘political first, political last, political always’. International Affairs, 85, 61–79. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00781.x
- Counterinsurgency: America’s Strategic Burden, 2009. The center on law and security - New York university school of law. New York, NY: Reiss Center on Law and Security.
- Darnton, C., 2012. Asymmetry and Agenda-setting in U.S.-Latin American relations: rethinking the origins of the alliance for progress. Journal of Cold War Studies, 14, 55–92. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00276
- Dixon, P., 2009. ‘Hearts and minds’? British counter-insurgency from Malaya to Iraq. Journal of Strategic Studies, 32, 353–381. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390902928172
- Edelstein, D., 2008. Exit strategies: when, how, and why do states end military interventions. San Francisco, CA: Annu. Conv. Int. Stud. Assoc.
- Eland, I., 2013. The failure of counterinsurgency: why hearts and minds are not always won. Santa Barbara, CA: Eland: Praeger.
- Elias, B., 2018. The big problem of small allies: new data and theory on defiant local counterinsurgency partners in Afghanistan and Iraq. Secur. Stud., 27, 233–262.
- Elias, B. 2020. Why Allies Rebel: Defiant Local Partners in Counterinsurgency Wars. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108784979
- Exum, A., 2010. Smoke and mirrors in Kabul. Foreign Policy. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/22/smoke_and_mirrors_in_kabul?wp_login_redirect=0 (accessed 26 July 2013).
- Galula, D. 2006. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Praeger.
- Gartner, S.S., 1999. Strategic Assessment in War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- George, A.L., 1991. Forceful persuasion: coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war. U.S. Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Press.
- Goldstein, A., 1995. Discounting the free ride: alliances and security in the postwar world. International Organization, 49, 39–71. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300001570
- Hansen, B., 2010. Unipolarity and world politics: A theory and its implications. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
- Hazelton, J., 2017. The ‘Hearts and minds’ fallacy: violence, coercion, and success in counterinsurgency warfare. International Security, 42, 80–113. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00283
- Horne, A., 2011. A savage war of peace: Algeria 1954–1962. New York, NY: New York Review of Books.
- Iida, K., 1993. When and how do domestic constraints matter?: two-level games with uncertainty. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37, 403–426. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002793037003001
- Interview with General Barry McCaffery, 2009. Nightly News.
- Jentleson, B.W., 1991. The Reagan administration and coercive diplomacy: restraining more than remaking governments. Political Science Quarterly, 106, 57–82. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2152174
- Keohane, R.O., 1971. The big influence of small Allies. Foreign Policy, 161–182. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/1147864
- Khan, H., 2009. Gates says Afghan withdrawal deadline may be delayed. ABC News.
- Knopf, J.W., 1993. Beyond two-level games: domestic–international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations. International Organization, 47, 599–628. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028113
- Koch, M.T. and Sullivan, P., 2010. Should I stay or should I go now? Partisanship, approval, and the duration of major power democratic military interventions. The Journal of Politics, 72, 616–629. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381610000058
- Krahmann, E., 2016. NATO contracting in Afghanistan: the problem of principal–agent networks. International Affairs, 92, 1401–1426. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12753
- Ladwig, W.C., 2016. Influencing clients in counterinsurgency: U.S. Involvement in El Salvador’s civil war, 1979–92. International Security, 41, 99–146. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00251
- Ladwig, W.C., 2017. The forgotten front: patron-client relationships in counter insurgency. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Liska, G., 1962. Nations in alliance: the limits of interdependence. Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lyall, J. and Wilson, I., III, 2009. Rage against the machines: explaining outcomes in counterinsurgency wars. International Organization, 63, 67–106. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090031
- Maley, W., 2011. Afghanistan in 2010. Asian Survey, 51, 85–96. doi:https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2011.51.1.85
- Marston, D., 2011. Counterinsurgency in modern warfare PB. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing.
- Masadykov, T., Giustozzi, A., and Page, J.M., 2010. Negotiating with the Taliban: toward a solution for the Afghan conflict (Monograph No. Working papers series 2, 66). Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Mcmahon, R.J., 2010. The politics, and geopolitics, of American troop withdrawals from Vietnam, 1968–1972. Diplomatic History, 34, 471–483. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2010.00862.x
- Merom, G., 2003. How democracies lose small wars: state, society, and the failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Nagl, J.A., 2007. Forward to the University of Chicago Press Edition: the evolution and importance of field manual 3–24, counterinsurgency. In: The U.S. Army/Marine corps counterinsurgency field manual (pp. xiii–xx). University of Chicago Press.
- Neumann, R.E., 2015. Failed relations between Hamid Karzai and the United States: what can we learn? Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Olson, M. and Zeckhauser, R., 1966. An economic theory of alliances. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 48, 266–279. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/1927082
- Papayoanou, P.A., 1997. Intra-Alliance bargaining and U.S. Bosnia policy. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41, 91–116. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002797041001005
- Pressman, J., 2008. Warring friends: alliance restraint in international politics. 2nd ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Putnam, R.D., 1988. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42, 427–460. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027697
- Sandler, T. and Hartley, K., 2001. Economics of Alliances: the lessons for collective action. Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 869–896. doi:https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.3.869
- Schelling, T., 1966. Arms and influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Schelling, T.C., 1981. The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press.
- Shafer, D.M., 1988a. The unlearned lessons of counterinsurgency. Political Science Quarterly, 103, 57–80. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2151141
- Shamir, J. and Shikaki, K., 2005. Public opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian two-level game. Journal of Peace Research, 42, 311–328. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343305052014
- Snyder, G.H., 2007. Alliance politics. Cornell University Press.
- Tago, A., 2009. When are democratic friends unreliable? The unilateral withdrawal of troops from the `Coalition of the willing’. Journal of Peace Research, 46, 219–234. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308100716
- Thayer, T., 1975. How to analyze a war without fronts : Vietnam, 1965–72. J. Def. Res., 7B.
- Thompson, R.G. 1966. Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam. New York: F. A. Praeger.
- Time to Pack Up and Leave Afghanistan, 2012. N. Y. Times.
- Trumbore, P.F., 1998. Public opinion as a domestic constraint in international negotiations: two-level games in the Anglo-Irish peace process. International Studies Quarterly, 42, 545–565. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00095
- U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, 1968. 138. Telegram from the embassy in Vietnam to the department of state.
- U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Baghdad, 2006a. Deputy PM Saleh Discusses Violence, Need for Continued MNF-I Presence, and PCNS Meeting with Congressman King, Ambassador, 06BAGHDAD4372.
- U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Baghdad, 2006b. Iraqi Pm Maliki Urges Iraqi Control Over Security, In Meeting With Nsa Hadley.
- U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Baghdad, 2007a. CODEL McCain meets with GOI officials, 07BAGHDAD1169.
- U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Baghdad, 2007b. Hashimi Warns Against Withdrawal, Advocates Sunni Engagement.
- U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Kabul, 2006. Karzai, A Lame Duck President? 06KABUL3198.
- Wadhams, C., 2010, Why we should keep to the July 2011 timeline in Afghanistan [WWW Document]. Cent. Am. Prog. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2010/09/08/8412/why-we-should-keep-to-the-july-2011-timeline-in-afghanistan/ accessed 26 July 2013.
- Walt, S.M., 1987. The origins of alliances. New York, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Wehrle, E.F., 2005. Between a river & a mountain. Michigan, USA: University of Michigan Press.
- White House Special Files, 1969. Memorandum of Conversation, President Nixon, President Thieu, Henry Kissinger, Nguyen Phu Duc.
- Zeleny, J., 2008. Troops in Afghanistan need help, Obama says. N. Y. Times.